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NAFTA.
2 The neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework, one of the canonical trade models, predicts that trade liberalization would lead to convergence in the prices of traded goods, which in turn would induce factor price convergence. In addition to the significant increase in trade noted above, Robertson, Kumar, and Dutkowsky (2009) find strong support for convergence in goods-level prices between Mexico and the United States, making the lack of convergence in income inconsistent with the prediction of trade models.
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The lack of convergence in GDP per capita is also at odds with some labor-based migration models. 4 At the most basic level, an increase in labor supply from migration should reduce wages if the aggregate labor demand curve is downward sloping. Although debated, Borjas (2003) provides empirical evidence for the downward-sloping labor demand curve.
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Emerging evidence also suggests that emigration increases wages of workers who stay behind. Mishra (2007) provides evidence that Mexican emigration bids up Mexican wages, and Elsner (2013a) finds similar results for Lithuania. Elsner (2013b) finds that emigration's effects are not uniform throughout the wage distribution. Convergence should be the most prominent for demographic groups with the highest propensity to migrate. Such movements would tend to raise Mexican wages and depress U.S. wages, thereby reinforcing the effects of free trade on wage convergence. Alternatively, migration could increase the differential in the presence of agglomeration effects (Brezis and Krugman 1996, Giovanni et al. 2015) , making our application relevant for the debate on migration's effect on wages as well.
Despite the lack of convergence in the per capita GDPs of Mexico and the United States over the past 25 years, there are ample reasons that would point towards increased wage 2 See Brown (1992) for a survey of early general equilibrium models of NAFTA. 3 The lack of evidence of factor price equalization generally has prompted many to question the validity of neoclassical HOS-type models. Schott (2003) finds that we live in a "multi-cone" world that precludes factor price equalization. Davis and Mishra (2007) suggest that ignoring important variation between the mix of factors employed in the production of domestic and imported goods obfuscates the possible effect that free trade may depress the wages of workers in relatively labor-intensive domestic industries. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) discuss evidence of rising inequality in poorer countries in the wake of many trade liberalizations in the eighties and nineties, which is very much at odds with a standard HOS story of how globalization should unfold. The authors provide numerous reasons why the predictions of the standard HOS theory may not hold in the data such as technology, the pattern of tariff reductions, and within-industry shifts. 4 It is possible to analyze migration using general-equilibrium trade models. In the HOS framework, immigration is generally analyzed through the Rybczynski and Factor Price Insensitivity theorems. Under the assumptions that the two countries are in the same diversification cone and are small enough for immigration to have no effect on output prices, these theorems predict that immigration has no effect on wages because immigrants are absorbed through changes in the production mix. 5 For example, Card (1990 Card ( , 2001 argues that the evidence for migration's effect on wages is weak.
3 convergence over this period, particularly for demographic groups that are most affected by trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and migration. In this paper, we carefully measure Mexico-U.S. wage differentials (the place premium) for specific demographic groups and track these over time. We then quantify the extents to which trade, FDI, and migration may have helped to narrow these differentials.
While no specific papers have attempted to answer these questions, several related papers focus on within-country convergence or short-run convergence. Some studies have investigated wage convergence within countries and early studies of the Mexican labor market did indeed detect evidence of it (Hanson 1996 , and Chiquiar 2001 . Another study by Robertson (2000) finds a strong, positive correlation between short-run wage growth in the United States and short-run wage growth for Mexican workers who reside on the border with the United States.
Hanson (2003) also finds a similar result. Robertson (2005) , however, finds no evidence that NAFTA increased the estimated degree of labor market integration between the United States and Mexico as measured by the transmission of short-run shocks.
Our paper differs from these others along a number of dimensions. First, unlike
Robertson (2000), we are not concerned with the short-term transmission of wage shocks across national boundaries. Second, we are not concerned with regional convergence within Mexico.
Rather, we carefully document the evolution of Mexico-U.S. wage differentials over a long horizon and try and understand the mechanisms behind these movements. So, we provide a more descriptive "bird's eye" view of the data that is then interpreted through the lens of some workhorse theories (e.g. HOS). We believe this to be an important omission from the literature.
We do this by using two complementary methodologies and four data sources. The first approach matches quarterly survey data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the United
States and the Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo (ENOE) in Mexico. 6 The second approach employs census data from Mexico and the United States for three different time periods. Clemens et al. (2008) use very similar data and a similar approach. The main difference is that they compare a single cross section for multiple countries; we compare a single country pair and multiple time periods.
6 In addition to the ENOE, we use its predecessors, the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE) and the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU).
When using the survey data, we first divide Mexican and U.S. working-age people into 45 age-education cells. Comparing exclusively Mexican and U.S. workers in the same educationage cell effectively controls for variation in returns to skill and allows us to use quarterly data to identify time-series patterns. The disadvantage is that it focuses only on workers residing in urban areas in Mexico.
The second approach overcomes this disadvantage by using census data that include rural workers. These data have the added advantages that the sample sizes are larger, they have more complete information about hours worked, and they capture long-run differences. The disadvantage of census data is that the data are observed only once every ten years. With these data, we first compare mean wage differentials by education and age cell and look at how these have evolved over time. Next, we look deeper into the data and investigate how the relative wage distributions have evolved over time by comparing changes in a given percentile for a given age and education level.
On the whole, the results demonstrate that there has been very little, if any, wage convergence between the U.S. and Mexico over time. While the 1994 peso crisis obviously contributed to the lack of convergence, we find some evidence for divergence even beyond the effects of the peso crisis. Although there is evidence of some convergence in the high-migration groups, this seems to be primarily due to falling U.S. wages at the bottom of the U.S. income distribution, as opposed to rising Mexican wages.
While this "bird's eye" look at the data does not appear to indicate much wage convergence despite large increases in economic integration, a more detailed look at the data does suggest that investment in Mexico and migration may have narrowed the US-Mexico wage gap, but only to a small degree. Indeed, the census data reveal that there was convergence in the border region of Mexico relative to the interior in the 1990s, but divergence in the 2000s. Since FDI in Mexico is mainly concentrated in the border, FDI may indeed have led to some initial wage convergence. We also estimate some common specifications from the literature on migration and wages and find that there is some evidence that increased migration can narrow the place premium.
Despite this suggestive evidence that migration, FDI, and trade may arbitrage the USMexico wage differential, their effects are very modest when compared to the overall difference.
Particularly, even if we adopt methods from the literature that are the most likely to deliver the 5 largest effects of migration on wages, an impossibly high level of migration would be needed to achieve wage equalization. In addition, when we compare the evolution of Mexican wages in its border and its interior, the wage gains in the border during the 1990s are relatively modest when compared to the overall differential. We conclude that the place premium is largely stable, even following large reductions to trade and investment barriers and high migration. This may indicate that the US-Mexico place premium has more to do with productivity differentials than it has to do with trade, FDI, and migration barriers.
We begin by discussing the four data sources that we use in Section I. We then present some descriptive empirical results in Section II and III in which we elucidate some of the patterns in the evolution of Mexico-U.S. wage differentials over the past 25 years. We then investigate some of the mechanisms that may be behind what convergence we do see in the previous sections in Section IV. Finally, we conclude in Section V.
I. Data
We use four datasets that represent two separate types of data. Both datasets are broadbased in the sense that they cover both formal and informal-sector workers. The first type is quarterly urban household survey data that cover the 1988-2011 period. U.S. household survey data cover both urban and rural U.S. households, but the rural population is relatively small.
Second, we use census data that have two advantages over the survey data. The first is that the Mexican census data contain much more accurate information about rural households. The second is that the sample sizes are much larger so we can obtain a more detailed understanding of what is happening to the relative wage distributions. That said, they have the disadvantage of only being available in ten-year intervals.
Household Survey Data
We extract all data on Mexican households from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo 7 We also converted Mexican wages to 1990 U.S. dollars by first deflating the wages to 1990 pesos using the Mexican CPI and then converting them to U.S. dollars using the 1990 exchange rate. Overall, this alternative method did not make too much of a difference. We conduct a comparison of these two deflation methods in the appendix.
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The U.S. workforce is significantly more educated than the Mexican workforce, with about 90% of all workers in each time period having at least completed high school education.
By contrast, the number of Mexican workers with more than a high school education ranges from 16% in 1988-1994 to 21% in 2008-2011 . The average education of the Mexican workforce has increased significantly. 8 The steady rise in the number of high school graduates and college attendees has been accompanied by a steady decline in the number of workers with 0-4 years of education, which dropped from 20% in 1988-1994 to 11% in 2008-2011 . The largest gains emerge in the 9-12 category because Mexico raised the compulsory education requirement from 6 to 9 years in 1992. Ideally, survey data would collect information from surveyed individuals at regular intervals, and neatly organize it as panel data. In the absence of such data, it is possible to use a time series of cross-sectional surveys (Deaton, 1985) . We create 45 age-education cells when using the survey data. In the absence of significant changes to the composition of the cells, the average behavior of each cell over time should approximate the estimates obtained from genuine panel data (Deaton, 1997) . Since our focus is not on wage growth of individuals over time, we do not "age" the cells.
Working-age adults in each sample are subdivided into five education categories and nine age categories. The first age group includes workers aged 19-23 years old; the second includes workers aged 24-28, the third those aged 29-33, and so forth. The first education group includes adults with 0-4 years of education; the second includes adults with 5-8 years of education; the next comprise those with 9-12, 13-16 and finally more than 16 years of education. These categories are chosen to match the classification used in the census data (described below) and are roughly comparable to those employed by Robertson (2000) , Borjas (2003), and Mishra (2007) . 10 Unlike Borjas (2003) , we are able to identify greater variation in the group of working adults who have not completed high school. We exclude workers with zero or unreported amounts of education. Once workers are assigned to the 45 categories, we take the average wage 8 Lustig et al. (2012) argue that the increase in the supply of education in Mexico played a significant role in reducing income inequality in Mexico. 9 See http://wenr.wes.org/2013/05/wenr-may-2013-an-overview-of-education-in-mexico. 10 One might be reasonably concerned that workers in the same cells are not comparable across countries. In fact, cell comparability has been contentious in the literature. Alternative matches, such as Mexican workers with 9-11 years of schooling being matched with U.S. workers with 6-8 years of schooling, might be justified using occupation data. Since a thorough analysis of such matches might be worthy of its own study, we consider alternative matches to be beyond the scope of the current paper and instead follow the convention established in these papers.
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of each cell with the sample weights. We then calculate the wage differential by subtracting the log of the mean wage of each Mexican cell from the matched log of the mean wage of each U.S.
cell.
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Rather than graph the individual wage differences for all 45 cells, Figure 1 To formally identify structural breaks in the average differential, we apply tests for unknown breaks described by Vogelsang and Perron (1998) . Figure Organization. Therefore, in the empirical work that follows, we include structural breaks in both 1994 and 2001.
13 11 We also generate the same results using the mean of the person-level log monthly earnings and get basically identical results. 12 Dussel, Peters, and Gallagher (2013) argue that China had a significantly negative influence on NAFTA trade. Mexican-born workers in the United States comprise a progressively declining share of the workforce among older groups. We also see that the bulk of Mexicans residing in the United
States tend to be less educated.
Census Data
We employ three years of census data from Mexico and the US: 1990 , 2000 (Minnesota Population Center 2014 and Ruggles, et al. 2010 ). We use a 10 percent sample from the Mexican census. For the years 1990 and 2000, we use a 5 percent sample from the U.S.
census. For 2010, we employ the American Community Survey, which is a 1 percent sample of the population.
The sample selection criteria that we use for the census data mimic that of the survey data. Specifically, we include men between ages 19 and 63 who report positive income in the previous year. In Mexico, hourly wages are constructed by taking monthly earnings and then dividing by reported hours worked during a typical week times 4.33. In the United States, hourly wages were computed by taking reported yearly earnings and then dividing by reported usual hours worked per year. 14 As with the survey data, all wages are in 1990 U.S. dollars. Mexican wages were, once again, converted to 1990 dollars by, first, converting wages in pesos to U.S. Dollars using the exchange rate for that year and then deflating the wages to 1990 dollars using 14 Hours worked per year were obtained by taking usual hours worked per week times the number of weeks that the respondent reported to have worked during the year.
the U.S. CPI. In the appendix, we discuss an alternative way of converting Mexican wages to 1990 dollars and we show that the difference is negligible.
We employ two samples from the Mexican census. The first is a sample of all workers meeting the criteria defined above, which we simply call the whole sample. The second is a sample of primarily urban dwellers that includes the metropolitan areas employed in the survey data. We call this the urban sample. Comparing these two is important because Mexico experienced a movement from rural to urban areas during this time period. Such a movement might affect our results if we find that urban wages are falling relative to rural wages, and such a comparison is impossible with the survey data described above. Table 2 displays descriptive statistics from the census data. The differences between Table 1 and Table 2 
II. Descriptive Results: Household Survey Data
Our main variable of interest is the long-run US-Mexican wage differential across ageeducation cells. The trend in the long-run differentials may be affected by exogenous shocks (e.g. trade liberalization and exchange rate shocks) and differences in migration costs and benefits across cells. To describe the changes in the long-run differential, we use a simple trend 11 analysis that accounts for both the peso crisis and the 2001 trend break. Table 3 contains the results from three equations
where the dependent variable is equal to the difference between the natural log of the U.S. The joint broken trend model in column 3 shows a lack of convergence after the peso crisis and recovery period. Note that each coefficient represents the marginal trend difference in each period. The trend for each period is equal to the sum of the current period coefficient and any previous period coefficient(s). The trend (standard error) for the 2001+ period, therefore, is equal to -0.0003 (0.0008), which could be described as a precisely estimated zero value (the 95% confidence interval is -0.0019 to 0.0013). This period follows the recovery from the peso crisis and therefore may be a better indicator of the longer-run effects of NAFTA. This period is also 12 characterized by slowing migration from Mexico into the United States. We now compare these results with those that emerge from the census data.
III. Descriptive Results: Census Data
We first use the census data to describe US-Mexico wage differentials by plotting the mean wage differential for education/age cells in the three census years. We plot these differentials for every age between 19 and 63 and for five educational categories using both the entire and the urban Mexican samples. The results are in Figure 5 .
The figure reveals some interesting patterns. 
IV. Investigating Possible Mechanisms
The finding of the previous section that there is very little convergence except for less educated people is interesting given that Mexico and the U.S. have become increasingly more integrated over the past 25 years. In this section, we look at the data in greater detail to try and better understand the effects of migration, trade, and FDI on the Mexico-U.S. wage differential since all three can integrate labor markets. To investigate the possibility that migration can narrow the US-Mexico wage gap, we will estimate models that are similar to those from Borjas (2003) and Mishra (2007) . To investigate the potential impact of trade, we will look for evidence of Stolper-Samuelson effects by estimating the distributions of wage differentials for different educational groups. Finally, to investigate the potential impact of FDI, we will estimate border effects in Mexico since FDI is concentrated along the US-Mexico border.
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Migration
Mexican migration to the United States has inspired a large academic and public policy literature. Much of this literature focuses on understanding the demographic patterns of migration. While our data contain many demographic controls, they do not allow us to distinguish documented from undocumented migrants. Migration was rising in the 1990s when nearly 7.5 million Mexican immigrants arrived. 15 The trend reversed and fell throughout the 2010s.
To investigate the impact of migration on the US-Mexico wage differential, we define three migration measures and investigate how each of these impacts the wage differential. The We begin by looking at the potential impact of migration on the wage differential in the survey data. To do this, we included the three measures of migration in the trend models described in Table 3 . For each measure, three specifications are estimated. The first includes cell fixed effects. Cell fixed effects control for differences across cells such that the coefficient on the migrant share is identified by changes within cells. The second includes just time fixed effects. In this specification, the migration coefficient is identified by variation across cells.
This specification might be best interpreted as the effect of the wage differential on migration.
The third specification includes both time and cell fixed effects such that the migration coefficient is identified by changes across cells and time.
The results are reported in Table 4 and generally suggest that an increase in the migrant share, regardless of how it is measured, reduces the US-Mexico differentials (although the effect is not always statistically significant). In the between-effects specifications, controlling for time such that the migration coefficient is identified across cells suggests that high-differential cells have higher migration. This is consistent with a simple migration model in which larger differentials attract more migrants. Controlling for these differences, however, shows that an increase in the number of migrants tends to drive down the differences between Mexico and the United States.
Next, we turn to the census data and estimate a somewhat standard estimation model in the migration literature (e.g. Borjas (2003) and Mishra (2007) ). Specifically, we estimate similarly, when the U.S. wage is the dependent variable, we weight using the U.S. population size in that cell. As in Table 4 , when using the differential as the dependent variable, we weight using the total population from the United States and Mexico in that cell.
We report the results in Table 5 . The first three columns report the effects of emigration on Mexican wages. Note that while our preferred migration measure when the dependent variable is Mexican wages is the share of Mexicans residing within the U.S. as a share of Mexicans residing in Mexico in a given cell, we also employ the other two migration measures, "immigration" and "total mobility" in columns 2 and 3 for the sake of thoroughness. The next three columns (4-6) report the effects of immigration on U.S. wages and the final three columns report the effects of migration on the wage differential. The results in the top panel use the whole Mexican Sample and the results in the bottom panel only use the urban sample.
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In columns 1-3, we see do not see any evidence that emigration raises Mexican wages. In fact, the signs are reversed. This is not consistent with Mishra (2007) who finds evidence that emigration raises Mexican wages using census data.
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In columns (4)- (6), we look at the effects of immigration on U.S. wages. These estimates are all negative and most are significant. Our preferred estimate here is in column 5 where we use Mexicans as a share of the U.S. population or "immigration" as the explanatory variable.
The estimate is -0.523 and indicates that a one percentage point increase in the migrant share in the United States is associated with a 0.523% decline in U.S. wages. The estimates using the measure of emigration tend to be the smallest at -0.091 in the full sample and -0.121 in the urban sample, whereas the estimates using the total migration measure tend to be the highest at -1.535
in the full sample and -0.823 in the urban sample.
Finally, in columns (7)- (9), we look at the effects of migration on the US-Mexico wage differential. Note that because the weighting schemes differed between columns 1-3, 4-6, and 7-9, these estimates are not simply the difference between the estimates in columns 4-6 and the corresponding estimates in columns 1-3. Because the estimates of emigration on Mexican wages have the Brazis-Krugman (1996) sign, many of the estimates of the effect of migration on the differential are positive. For example, we see this in column 7 in both panels. The only negative estimates are in Columns 8 and 9 in the bottom panel but neither of these estimates is significant.
Interestingly, using what we view as the most appropriate measure of mobility in column 9, we obtain an estimate of -0.307 which is reasonably close to the corresponding estimate in column 3
of Table 4 of -0.630.
At this point, it is important to ask, based on our estimates, how high would immigration to the United States need to be to eliminate the US-Mexico wage differential. Before we carry out this simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, however, we must reiterate that we do not find any evidence that emigration raises Mexican wages and that the negative effects on the differential are driven purely by immigration driving down U.S. wages. It is also important to 16 Understanding why we do not replicate her result is beyond the scope of this paper since this is simply an auxiliary exercise intended to shed light on what might narrow the US-Mexico wage gap. Some possible reasons for the difference are that Mishra uses the 1970, 1990 and 2000 censuses and that she also uses a slightly different specification. Note that when we do use a specification that is more similar to her specification, we do get a positive sign although we think that the specification in the reported results is better since it identifies the effects of emigration completely off of variation within cells. The take-away of this is that these numbers cast doubt on the ability of migration to narrow trans-national wage gaps, in part, because some of the estimates of the effects of emigration on wages do not appear to be terribly robust.
bear in mind that the methods that we used in this subsection are, indeed, controversial and much work by Card (1990 and 2001) finds smaller effects. For this exercise, this is actually not critical. One can remain agnostic about this literature but accept that using the methods of Borjas (2003) will most likely result in the largest effects of immigration wages. So, in this sense, this exercise will deliver a lower bound on the extent to which immigration will have to increase to equalize wages in Mexico and the United States.
Based on our data, within an educational group, the US-Mexico wage differential in the census is on the order of eight which translates to 2.08 log-points. 17 If we use the estimate of -0.307 in column 9 in the bottom panel, we obtain that of the ratio of Mexicans in the U.S. to the total combined population of the two countries would have to be about seven to equalize wages across borders. 18 Since this is impossible, this is another way of saying that these estimates do not indicate that migration can fully arbitrage the place premium.
Trade: Stolper-Samuelson Effects
Next, we investigate the role that trade plays in narrowing the US-Mexico wage gap.
One way to evaluate the effect of trade on wage convergence is to focus on changes across different education groups. Specifically, the neoclassical trade theories that predict factor price equalization imply that the wages of less-educated workers would rise in Mexico and fall in the United States. Wages should therefore converge for less-educated workers but possibly diverge for more educated workers as predicted by Stolper-Samuelson.
We begin with Figure 6 , which shows mean wage differentials for the two highest and two lowest education groups in the survey data. Wage differentials for less-educated workers are higher than for more educated workers, which is consistent with Mexico being a less-educatedworker-abundant country. The time trends for the two groups, however, are very similar. Mexico (1987 Mexico ( -1994 , we do see divergence of the less-educated groups and convergence of the more educated groups. After NAFTA, however, the differences in convergence/divergence trends are very small.
Next, we now consider how the U.S. and Mexican wage distributions evolved from 1990
to 2010 for specific education groups. This will allow us to investigate the presence of StolperSamuelson effects in the census data. To do this, we compute differences in percentiles of the U.S. and Mexican wage distribution by education and year for 2000-1990 and 2010-2000 . To fix ideas, we let ( ) denote the th percentile for education cell k at year t in country l. We then plot the difference in difference calculated as wages fell behind quite a bit, particularly, at the bottom of the distribution. Mexican wages also declined over this period but, typically, by a smaller magnitude.
There is, however, one very important difference in the behavior of the wage structure of following trade liberalization between a labor-abundant and a labor-scarce country. We must caution once again, however, that the findings in the next section will strongly indicate that this result has more to do with a third factor than with US-Mexico trade.
We now turn to the college-educated in the third row. In the whole sample, we do not see that we saw in Figure 7 for the college-educated between 1990 and 2000 was due to gains in Mexico.
FDI: Border Effects
We now look into the possible impact of FDI on the wage differential by focusing on border effects. The main idea behind this exercise is that the border region of Mexico has traditionally received the bulk of FDI in Mexico. In addition, Figure 1 showed that the peso crisis of 1994 may confound our ability to detect any convergence during the 1990's that may have occurred. Because we will estimate a "triple diff" variant of equations (5a) and (5b) with the third difference being between the border and the interior and because the crisis impacted the entirety of Mexico, this third difference mitigates the bias from this confounding factor.
We begin with Figure 9 , which divides the household survey data into border and interior regions. As is well known, the figure shows that wage differentials are larger for the interior than they are for the border. Smaller border differentials are consistent with a positive effect of FDI on wage convergence. The main point of the figure, however, is that the difference between the border and the interior is small relative to the overall differential. So, while FDI may contribute to wage convergence, its contribution appears to be modest.
Next, we consider a triple-difference version of the exercise from the previous sub- wages in Mexico's border region increased at a more rapid rate than in the interior. This is particularly the case in the urban sample. It is important to emphasize that we see large movements in wage differentials in the border area relative to the interior once we restrict the sample to more urban areas. During the 1990's, wages in these cities close to the border saw large gains relative to the rest of Mexico and this was subsequently reversed in the 2000's.
There are a few important points to take-away from Figures 9 and 10. First, the convergence that we see in the border relative to the interior in the 1990's does indeed indicate that FDI or, possibly trade, can narrow the wage differential and it suggests that the Peso Crisis is most likely behind the lack of convergence that we saw during the period 1990-2000. Second, differentials got larger in the border region by a large margin in the period 2000-2010. While we do not know the exact reason for this, Dussel, Peters, and Gallagher (2013) speculate that China's entry into the WTO was associated with a reduction of FDI into Mexico. Figure 10 is consistent with this. In addition, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) provide evidence that Chinese trade had adverse consequences for real wage growth for low skilled Americans, which suggests that the wage convergence that we showed in Figure 7 during the period 2000-2010 was not due to Stolper-Samuelson but instead a consequence of a third factor, namely, China's entry to the WTO. Finally, while Figure 10 does indicate that FDI can narrow wage differentials, Figure 9 shows that the border effects are small so that the place premium would be intact even in the presence of large investments in Mexico.
Finally, to quantify the magnitude of these border effects, we estimate the following regression (7) = + * + + + where is the log Mexican wage in education/age cell i, in Mexican state s at time t. The vector contains year dummies and * is a vector of year dummies interacted with border dummies. Note that an observation is now an education/age/state/time cell whereas with the migration regressions, it was an education/age/time cell. Another important difference between these regressions and the migration regressions is that the migration regressions used nine age groups to be consistent with Borjas (2003) and Mishra (2007) , whereas when estimating equation (7), we did not use bins but used cells for all ages between 19 and 63.
We estimate this equation separately using weights from the Mexican census and the U.S.
census as well as without any weights. Using these different weighting schemes allows us to carry out something akin to the Oaxaca decomposition. For example, estimating border effects using weights from the U.S. Census allows us to gain some insights into what the effects of FDI on Mexican wages would be if Mexico's demographic structure was more like that of the United
States.
The results are reported in Table 6 . The main effects can be seen by differencing the interactions of the year and border dummies across subsequent years. We see that from 1990 to 2000, Mexican wages in states bordering the United States gained between 4.7% and 7.5% relative to the interior. These estimates are remarkably stable across samples and weighting schemes. If we use a US-Mexico differential of eight (or 2.08 log-points) as we did in the previous subsection, the border effects during the 90's constitute about a 2-3.5% narrowing of the differential. Once again, this is not trivial but not nearly enough to achieve absolute wage convergence.
On the other hand, we see very strong declines in real wages over the period 2000-2010.
When we employ the weights from the Mexican Census, the estimate is -18.7% when we use the 22 entire sample and -17.3% when we use urban Mexicans. Using the U.S. weights in columns (2) and (5) attenuates these estimates; they become -14.0% and -14.1% in the entire and urban samples, respectively. If relatively less educated Mexicans were the most adversely affected in the 2000's then using U.S. weights should understate these effects in the estimation. While the estimates in this table are by no means the final word, they are (once again) very much consistent with a story in which wage gains in the 1990s were subsequently reversed in the 2000s. In any case, there is little to no evidence of wage convergence.
V. Conclusion
The significant and well documented "place premium" across countries could be a where the effects of NAFTA are believed to be disrupted by Chinese trade (Dussel, Peters, and Gallagher 2013) and are also driven by a precipitous decline in real U.S. wage for low skilled workers, which has also been attributed to Chinese trade (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013) . This casts doubt that these relative wage movements can be attributed to US-Mexico integration.
Finally, comparing relative wage movements between Mexico's border and interior does indicate that there was some convergence in the border region during the period 1990-2000 but 23 that this was reversed subsequently in the period 2000-2010. This suggests that the lack of convergence that we see in the 1990's when we take a bird's eye view of the data was due to the Peso Crisis of 1994. It also indicates that NAFTA may have, indeed, brought about some degree of wage convergence but that this was then reversed during the 2000's possibly because of China's entry into the WTO. The magnitude of these border effects, however, is very modest when compared to the overall wage differential.
We conclude that, although migration, commercial integration, and FDI may narrow the US-Mexico wage gap, their effects appear to be modest. Indeed, in the face of a large d egree of economic integration, the US-Mexico place premium has remained remarkably stable and we hope to explore other possible explanations in future work. This suggests that the international wage differences are the consequence of something other than trade, FDI, and migration barriers.
Productivity differences may be one explanation, as indicated by Kennan (2013) , but our results suggest opportunities for future research.
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Appendix: Alternative Wage Measurements
In the paper, we convert Mexican wages to 1990 dollars by, first, converting the wage to U.S. dollars using the nominal exchange rate for that year and then by deflating the wage to 1990 U.S. dollars using the U.S. CPI. An alternative (and equally viable) procedure would have been to deflate the Mexican wages to 1990 pesos using the Mexican CPI and then converting the wage to 1990 dollars using the nominal exchange rate from 1990. We call the wage that results from the former method MX Wage 1 and the wage that results from the second method MX Wage 2.
The comparisons of MX Wage1 and MX Wage2 using the census data are reported in Table A1 . The comparison of the mean value across cohorts of the two measures over time are shown in Figure A1 . As can be seen, the wages are very similar using the two methods of comparison. The raw correlation between the two in the census data is 0.9985 and 0.6936 in the household data indicating that it makes little difference if we use MX Wage 1 or MX Wage 2. Notes: All wages are in 1990 U.S. dollars. In Mexico, the monthly wage was computed by converting wages to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate for that quarter and then deflating the wages using the U.S. CPI (1990=1). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Mean N per quarter represents the average number of observed individuals per quarter per period (without population weight expansion). Notes: All wages are in 1990 U.S. dollars. In Mexico, the hourly wage was computed by converting wages to U.S. dollars using the exchange rate for that year and then deflating the wages using the U.S. CPI. U.S. census data were 5% samples except for the American Community Survey sample in 2010 which was a 1% sample. The Mexican census was a 10% sample for all three years. In Mexico, the whole sample uses all people who meet the sample criteria described above and the urban sample uses these criteria and further restricts the sample to the metropolitan areas that are employed in the Mexican survey data. 2000 -1990 MX 2000 -1990 US 2010 -2000 MX 2010 -2000 No High School 2000 -1990 MX 2000 -1990 US 2010 -2000 MX 2010 -2000 No High School 
